This update on Navy noises focuses on a communications problem that has resulted in delays, cancellations and an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust, complicating the Navy's mission, the government's responsibilities, and the public's awareness. It has become harder for everyone concerned with acoustical issues to learn enough about a project or experiment in a timely manner to make a valid judgment about its effects. Either because of multiple mistakes or a directed strategy, the Navy mottos seem to be "tell them little and tell them late" and "trust us". For example, the next LFA test in Hawaii was announced in a very limited way without a 30 day public comment period. Even the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is finding out about tests just before they are to start, if at all. This has left all concerned with no choice but to argue for delays.

The Navy had made a distinct effort to "go green" with the LFA Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) process, but only after questioning by the Natural Resources Defense Council in 1995. When the LFA DEIS was criticized strongly the Navy seemed stung with the scientific, official, and public rebuke to what they perceived as an unusually open, cooperative and expensive effort.

Problems with the LFA DEIS continue to appear long after its debauched debut. For example, it had concluded from the associated Scientific Research Program (SRP) that there were no significant biological impacts in Hawaii. In contrast a recent article in the scientific journal Nature, by Dr. Patrick Miller of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, concluded that humpback whales' songs changed in response to noises from the LFA projectors used in the 1998 SRP tests off Maui. He suggested that sonar transmissions by the U.S. Navy could disrupt whale breeding and cause other behavioral changes.

In mid-March several cetacean species were part of a mass stranding in the Bahamas, coinciding with Littoral Warfare Advanced Development test (LWAD) 00-1 and many other naval operations. Both the Navy and NMFS have declared that the LWAD 00-1 was not the culprit, based on time and distance. Although officials and scientists have been unable to link the biological damage to a specific source of acoustic energy or pressure the coincidental transit by a task force using tactical sonars is considered a probable cause. The bombshell conclusion, still preliminary, is that certain complex combinations of naval operations and local characteristics cause whales and dolphins to strand.

Correcting CSI's initial report in April, this was not a unique event. Since 1838, 49 mass strandings have been recorded of beaked whales. Only seven were mixed species mass strandings, all of which occurred only within the past 30 years on the islands of Corsica, the Canary Islands, and most recently the Bahamas. All had naval maneuvers being conducted in the area of the strandings. Several other recent events in the Caribbean have similarities to the Bahamas strandings but their remote locations prevented useful determinations. An ongoing Navy and NOAA investigation into the Bahamas stranding pooled data from biologists, officials and the Navy at workshops in June and July. All six beaked whales studied had some evidence of trauma to tissue associated with hearing or sound production, caused by a distant explosion or an intense acoustic event; the animals may have lost their equilibrium or ability to orient. Other species stranded too, but it is not clear if conclusions will be extended to them. Results may not be final until early in 2001. CSI is very grateful for all the dedicated expertise directed to this problem. We look to NMFS to maintain their authority over such destructive operations, extreme harassment by any definition. We look to the Navy to meet their regulatory obligations and stated goals regarding marine mammals. The Navy has acknowledged the priority need to define potential impacts from combinations of tactical sonars in certain environments, but has not indicated that operational constraints are in effect pending the investigation.

As if the open LFA DEIS process was an experiment that had failed, the Navy in April became more closed and formal, opting for last minute, minimal compliance with requirements to get on with the mission. Communications became more guarded, by procedure as well as by a breakdown of trust and confidence. Even stereotypes and personalities got in the way of logic and communications.

The furor over the Bahamas stranding and LWAD 00-1 uncovered a pattern of the Navy pushing the envelope for minimal permit and authorization processes with NMFS. Environmental Assessments (EAs) are supposed to describe projects in a timely manner, with enough information to justify official authorizations, and to allow concerned people to judge potential impacts. The public did not review the EA for LWAD 00-1 until after the test. The EA for the LWAD 00-2 Naval test scheduled for late May off New Jersey was requested by many, but for unrelated reasons was very late; CSI never got one. Many people complained to NMFS about the situation. NMFS balked at the increasing Navy pressures for official approval with minimal compliance. In a strong letter NMFS declared that a more cooperative, open and compliant process was required. The test was cancelled.

Environmental groups became frustrated and suspicious of anything to do with the Navy and noise; some reacted as if every active acoustical test was an immediate threat. Unrelated projects were affected. For example, the Delaware Bay High-Frequency Acoustic Experiment was disapproved in July by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection for concerns with commercial fisheries. But perhaps the DEP had given the project an extra-hard look after being besieged by letters of justified concern from environmental groups that had been unable to get information on the project as the start date loomed. Most groups were concerned with bottlenose dolphins with young calves that forage the area this time of year. It seemed prudent for qualified experts to assess possible impacts and implications. CSI could not take a position on the test without some information, and we assumed that responsible officials knew as little as we did. We now believe that the University of Delaware had been contracted by ONR to operate a 90-day project to study the physics of underwater sound from three acoustical sources in Delaware Bay as a possible monitor of the Bay's health. Poor communications caused an indefinite delay and considerable inconvenience to what may be a worthy project. We cannot tell; we will not get an EA for some time.

Another example of collateral damage is a project to test the reactions of sperm whales and beaked whales in the Azores to low frequency sounds. The Principle Investigators are Dr. Peter Tyack of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and Dr. Jonathan Gordon of Oxford University. This project also illustrates the basic dilemma inherent in understanding and regulating potential harm to marine organisms from human noise. CSI and many others advocate emphatically that regulating and managing human noise must start at the threshold where significant behaviors are changed, not the threshold of deafness as advocated by the Navy. If cetaceans avoid or flee an area critical for feeding, reproducing or migrating, because of human noise such as an LFA operation or a fleet in motion, the behavioral impacts alone may be severe. The Bahamas stranding proved also that "normal" fleet noises could destroy cetaceans; these were the whales and dolphins that could not get away. There is some evidence for noise levels that initiate negative behavioral changes, but not enough to allow officials to make and enforce regulations. In fact, there is considerable concern that regulations are being considered that will limit noise only at the physical impact levels, by default as high as 180 decibels, because the scientific evidence to support lower maximum levels, where behaviors are impacted, is not sufficient. But how do you test cetacean reactions to noise without causing harm? Some environmentalists do not think that is possible, and argue against all noise tests.

What if the tests were done by scientists with specific expertise, scientific integrity and extraordinary concern for whales? Can the right people do the tests without causing harm? We need to know the facts; without the data from such tests no one will ever have a clue about when human noises create significant behavioral impacts, or the ammunition to make enforceable policies and laws to constrain our damaging noise. On a personal note, having known Peter Tyack and Jonathan Gordon for many years, I consider them among the very best people to do the job. By supporting their scientific research we urge all scientists and officials to move beyond inhumane tests that measure deafness, to help us all understand the only meaningful threshold that must become the regulatory limit: when do our noises cause significant negative behaviors? Tyack and Gordon will not harm whales; they will help us to know when our noises might do harm.

The Azores project became mired in LFA politics because a loaned U.S. Navy LFA projector had been considered as the transmitter early on. Because the LFA DEIS was considered to be grossly deficient by many, including CSI, in part for a lack of data on toothed whales, the use of a Navy LFA projector in the Azores implied that the Navy was seeking more data. In Hawaii a case against the LFA had been dismissed because the Navy had stated in court that no further tests on whales were required. The implication that an LFA projector was to be included in the Azores experiment became the basis of a legal appeal in Hawaii, which was denied.

However, the Navy and LFA are back in Hawaii. Without even a 30 day comment period, on 8 July the State of Hawaii Office of Environmental Quality Control publication, "The Environmental Notice" reported: "The U.S. Navy is proposing the potential use of the SURTASS LFA in waters surrounding the state of Hawaii, excluding ocean areas necessary to prevent exposure of 180 decibels within 22 kilometers / 12 nautical miles of land and 145 decibels within known recreational and commercial dive sites. SURTASS LFA sonar is intended to provide improved submarine detection capabilities, thereby sustaining its antisubmarine warfare mission". Notice that this does not specify tests on whales, but it will certainly be heard by many. Comments were due by 31 July.

Overall, the Navy's attitude appears arrogant, aggressive, and not in tune with the Navy's public statements. Almost all Navy and ONR projects' EAs use very similar language and conclusions. Outdated references are repeated and relied upon. Several reputable sources less supportive of the Navy's intent remain excluded. The EAs and requests were presented to NMFS at a local level unreasonably close to test start dates, pressuring officials with the cost and difficulty of last minute cancellations, for which NMFS is not responsible. Specific NMFS agents who might not even be well qualified for the issue would be pushed to sign off on a Navy test or operation with minimal time and inadequate information.

The clamor over LWAD 00-1 also briefly uncovered LWAD 00-3. Rumored for late summer in the Gulf of Maine, this test may have totally unknown effects, even to the Navy. Many scientific centers are concerned for the potential effects in their home regions. CSI's letter of 9 June requesting an EA on this project to Rear Admiral Gaffney, Chief, Office of Naval Research, has received no response. Other organizations have had similar experiences.

And yes, ATOC is back. A DEIS for the project, now referred to as the North Pacific Acoustic Laboratory Project, is out for comment on the plan to continue using the Hawaii cable and broadcast system for an additional five years. Public meetings were held in Kauai, Hawaii in early July. Please keep in mind that we are not dealing with the larger problem of broad scale and deep ocean impacts from commercial shipping, which are still beyond any hint of a solution. And our collective noises are only some of the ways we are polluting the seas. The evidence is clear that we are causing significant and accelerating changes. What to do about it all is still beyond us.